This past Sunday, the true President (as in the one who was elected but not chosen), Al Gore, gave a speech on the Bush administration’s endangerment of our civil liberties at the DAR Constitution Hall in Washington, DC. One section of that speech made it even clearer that there was more than enough information available in time to arrest all 9/11 terrorists before they could strike, and legally on top of that. In the quote (see the bottom of this post) from a Merkle foundation analysis, the authors mention that at least two of the attackers were on the INS’s terrorist watchlist and if they had been apprehended and the intelligence agencies had been allowed to connect the dots all the other terrorists could have been found and arrested as well. Although the FBI could have maybe only arrested them based on the clear and present danger they presented, at least they would have been locked up and their plans would have been foiled for good.
This proves my point which I have been making for months. 9/11 could have easily been prevented without any of the new powers the White House gave itself. And since protecting the security of the homeland is one of the most important responsibilities of the White House, this then gives further credibility to theories that mention the possibility of Bush’s people working together with Al Quaida in order to enrich their campaign donors and the wealthiest 10% by purchasing a convenient excuse for terrorizing the American People.
You may laugh at certain liberal slogans, but one is true: The true criminals are in the White House, not in the Middle East.
“A recent analysis by the Merkle foundation, (working with data from a software company that received venture capital from a CIA-sponsored firm) demonstrates this point in a startling way:
“In late August 2001, Nawaq Alhamzi and Khalid Al-Midhar bought tickets to fly on American Airlines Flight 77 (which was flown into the Pentagon). They bought the tickets using their real names. Both names were then on a State Department/INS watch list called TIPOFF. Both men were sought by the FBI and CIA as suspected terrorists, in part because they had been observed at a terrorist meeting in Malaysia. These two passenger names would have been exact matches when checked against the TIPOFF list. But that would only have been the first step. Further data checks could then have begun. Checking for common addresses (address information is widely available, including on the internet), analysts would have discovered that Salem Al-Hazmi (who also bought a seat on American 77) used the same address as Nawaq Alhazmi. More importantly, they could have discovered that Mohamed Atta (American 11, North Tower of the World Trade Center) and Marwan Al-Shehhi (United 175, South Tower of the World Trade Center) used the same address as Khalid Al-Midhar. Checking for identical frequent flier numbers, analysts would have discovered that Majed Moqed (American 77) used the same number as Al-Midhar. With Mohamed Atta now also identified as a possible associate of the wanted terrorist, Al-Midhar, analysts could have added Atta’s phone numbers (also publicly available information) to their checklist. By doing so they would have identified five other hijackers (Fayez Ahmed, Mohand Alshehri, Wail Alsheri, and Abdulaziz Alomari). Closer to September 11, a further check of passenger lists against a more innocuous INS watch list (for expired visas) would have identified Ahmed Alghandi. Through him, the same sort of relatively simple correlations could have led to identifying the remaining hijackers, who boarded United 93 (which crashed in Pennsylvania).” “
